Approved For Release 1999/09/16 CIA PUP 70:00963R00 COMM. G,6**15** 71.160 low Far on its Own? Post-mortems of the abortive Cuban have trusted a government agency to make invasion turned up a significant number all but will without the common of tactical and strategic errors allegedly gress. Rep. William Pitt, New York Democratical and strategic errors allegedly gress. committed by the Central Intelligence ocrat, also said in the House that the ently the CIA was operating a private Agency. These undoubtedly will be ex-amined by Congress when it considers a loreign policy of its own. proposal to subject this super-secret agency to Congressional supervision. It has been asserted that the agency's past successes in foreign political undertakings gave it an air of "omniscience and omnipotence" and persuaded officials in Washington to entrust it with the training of Cuban refugees for the invasion. CIA operatives who planned the invasion were said to have kept their superiors in the dark about many aspects of the plan. It is contended that they ignored an order by President Kennedy to exclude follows ers of the former Cuban dictator Fulgencio? Batista from the venture. The CIA agents reportedly, were reluctant to part with well-trained rightist leaders. Richard M. Bissell, Ir., a deputy of Allen Dulles, and Frank Bender, CIA arek chief in Guatemala, placed a young Cubert named Manuel Artime, who had had little military experience, in command of the special training camps in Guatemala, where the refugee recruits were shaped into a commands force. Initially, the plan worked out by the CIA and Artime called for are ation of 30 guerrilla and sabotage groups inside Cuba under orders to go into action at the moment see and air landings were made. However, the People's Revolutionary Movement, an underground organization directed by Manuel Ray, a one-time minister of Public Works, reportedly recrived no support and almost no equipment. The alleged reason for CIA's re-luctance to aid the only effective resistance movement in Cuba until simost the very considered too radical and politically up desirable.

Apparently few officials in Washington had any idea of the training fechniques of the CIA or the support given by the agency to right-wing groups. Rep. Paul G. Rogers, Florida Democrat, said in the House last year that "if it is true that the agency ] mapped the invasion plan, herded the Cuhan resistance leaders around like redhereled step-children and conducted mil-

hary operations in their stead, then well